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Abstract. General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-
rules are justiﬁed if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from
the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable
if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and
Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer
the original judgement. A method is given of generating harmonious general-elimination
rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfen-
ning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show
that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equiva-
lence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of
the grounds for assertion, ﬁnally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture
Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules
meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable.
Keywords: Harmony, General-elimination rules, Stability, Local completeness, Grounds,
Gentzen.
1. Introduction
The concept of general-elimination rules is inspired by Gerhard Gentzen’s
famous remark in [11] (translated in [40, p. 80]):
The introductions represent, as it were, the ‘deﬁnitions’ of the symbols
concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the ﬁnal analysis, than
the consequences of these deﬁnitions.
He was alluding to the introduction- (I-) and elimination- (E-) rules of his
natural deduction calculi. Gentzen [40, p. 81] continued:
It should be possible to display the E-inferences as unique functions
of their corresponding I-inferences.
The purpose behind general-elimination rules is to exhibit this functional
dependency by casting all the E-rules on the model of the familiar ∨E-rule
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for disjunction, aka proof by cases. What ∨E encapsulates is the idea that
whatever follows both from α and from β must follow from α ∨ β. More
generally, a GE-rule states that what follows from a formula is whatever
follows from the grounds for assertion of that formula.1
Consider ∨I: it has two cases:
α
α ∨ β ∨I1
β
α ∨ β ∨I2
The meaning conferred on α∨β is that it is assertible just when either α or
β are assertible. Moreover, since assertions of α and β exhaust the grounds
for assertion of α ∨ β, what follows from an assertion of α ∨ β must either
follow from α or from β. We thus obtain the single elimination-rule:
α ∨ β
[α]1
γ
[β]2
γ
γ
∨E(1, 2)
We can read this as saying that γ follows from α ∨ β iﬀ γ follows from α
and γ follows from β.
In general, rules may discharge assumptions.2 Even though ∨I discharges
no assumptions, ∨E discharges the assumptions of α and β.
Similar considerations apply to →I:
[α]1
β
α → β → I(1)
The meaning conferred on α → β is that it is assertible just in case β is
assertible on the basis of α, with the assumption of α being discharged by
the rule.
By the same reasoning that justiﬁed ∨E, what follows from the grounds
for α → β must follow from an assertion of α → β:
α → β
⎡
⎢⎣
α
...
β
⎤
⎥⎦
1
γ
γ →E(1)
1For the notion of general-elimination rule, see [22, esp. Sect. 1.2] and [42].
2In these cases, we enclose each discharged assumption in square brackets, and cross-
reference it with the rule that discharges it.
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We can read this as saying that γ follows from the assumption of β dependent
on α iﬀ γ follows from α → β. The →E-rule allows us to discharge the
assumption of β dependent on α. That is, the rule discharges the sequent
α ⇒ β. The use of ellipses marks the fact that the assumption is that of a
sequent.3 We will see how assumptions of sequents, marked by ellipses, can
be replaced by derivations in the discussion of harmony in Section 3 below.
Note that, even though the sequent α ⇒ β is discharged by →E, the rule
does not discharge the assumption α in the minor premise.4
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we set out
the formal analysis of derivations and rules presupposed in the rest of the
paper. In Section 3 we describe the procedure by which GE-rules for a con-
nective are generated by a set of I-rules for it. The notion of harmony (of
E-rules with I-rules) is described and we show that the GE-rules are in har-
mony with the I-rules from which they are generated. Section 4 introduces
the notion of stability between the I- and E-rules, which requires not only
that the E-rules be in harmony with the I-rules, but also that the I-rules be
in harmony with the E-rules. The remaining sections are dedicated to: (i)
distinguishing formal properties of I- and E-rules which are candidates for
capturing the harmony of I-rules with E-rules; and (ii) showing that I- and
GE-rules for a connective satisfy all of these properties. Consequently, the
I-rules for a connective are in harmony with its GE-rules. Since the GE-rules
are harmonious with the I-rules from which they are generated, it follows
that the I- and GE-rules of any connective are stable.
2. Formal Analysis
The aim of this section is to present the notion of derivation in systems S
of the sort that will be presupposed in the paper.
3The notion of sequent and the precise use of ellipses employed here are explained
formally in Section 2.
4→E is what Peter Schroeder-Heister calls a “higher-level” rule (thinking of the se-
quent α ⇒ β as itself a rule). We will consider for the purposes of this paper only
introduction-rules allowing at most for the discharge of the assumption of formulae. Thus,
only elimination-rules generated by the GE-procedure allowing at most for the discharge
of sequents whose assumptions are formulae are considered. In general, higher-level as-
sumptions can consist in sequents whose assumptions are sequents nested to any depth, in
a manner close to the account of higher-level rules oﬀered in [35]. For a more recent and
approachable discussion, see [37].
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Definition 1. (Sequent)
• Any wﬀ is a sequent of level 1.
• If Γ is a ﬁnite set of wﬀs, and α is a wﬀ, Γ ⇒ α is a sequent of level 2.
• If Γ is a ﬁnite set of wﬀs or sequents of level 2, and α is a wﬀ, Γ ⇒ α is
a sequent of level 3.
Notation α, β, γ, . . . are metavariables over wﬀs. π, πi, πik(i ∈ I, k ∈ K)
are metavariables over sequents, of all levels unless speciﬁed otherwise.
Γ,Δ,Θ are metavariables over sets of sequents. A sequent Γ ⇒ α where
Γ = {π1, . . . , πn} is written π1, . . . , πn ⇒ α.5
Definition 2. The antecedent, a(π), and the succedent, s(π), of a sequent
π are deﬁned as follows:
• a(π) =
{
∅ if π is of level 1
π1, . . . , πn if π = π1, . . . , πn ⇒ γ
• s(π) =
{
π if π is of level 1
γ if π = π1, . . . , πn ⇒ γ
Definition 3. (Rules of Inference)
• The form of an instance of a rule of inference, J , is an n + 1-tuple of
sequents of level 2 or 3, πi = Γi ⇒ αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+1, asserting that πn+1
is a consequence of π1, . . . , πn, written
π1 . . . πn
πn+1
J
• In general, Γn+1 =
⋃n
i=1(Γi − Θi) ∪ Θn+1. If Θi is non-empty, we say
that J discharges the sequents in Θi (wﬀs, or sequents of level 2).
• – If n = 0, J is a rule of level 0.
– Otherwise, if J discharges no assumptions, J is of level 1, and
– if the instances of J discharge assumptions of at most level n, then
J is of level n + 1.6
5Although the constituents of derivations will be sequents, following Gentzen’s presen-
tation in [12, Sect. 5], the systems considered, like his, are natural deduction systems, with
I- and E-rules.
6Note that in a sequent Γ ⇒ α, Γ consists of wﬀs or sequents of at most level 2, so
assumptions discharged can only be wﬀs or sequents of level 2, as in footnote 4.
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Notation Where πi is Γi ⇒ αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, the form of an instance of a
rule J
π1 . . . πn
πn+1
J
may also be written as
π1 . . . πn
αn+1
J
or as
α1 . . . αn
αn+1
J
If Θi is the set of discharged sequents in Γi, then the form may also be
written as
[Θ1]
α1 . . .
[Θn]
αn
αn+1
J
When π ∈ Θj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n is a sequent of level 2 of the form γ1, . . . , γk ⇒ β,
π may be written as
γ1, . . . , γk....
β
Definition 4. (Rules of S)
Operational Rules The operational rules of S, consisting of I-rules giv-
ing the meaning of the connectives and E-rules generated by the GE-
procedure (to be described in Section 3), will vary depending on the
system, of, e.g., minimal, intuitionistic or classical logic, considered. The
rules ∨I1, ∨I2, ∨E, →I and →E of Section 1 are written in sequent (aka
logistic7) notation as follows:
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β ∨I1
Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β ∨I2
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β Δ, α ⇒ γ Θ, β ⇒ γ
Γ,Δ,Θ ⇒ γ ∨E
Γ, α ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α → β → I
Γ ⇒ α → β Δ, α ⇒ β ⇒ γ
Γ,Δ ⇒ γ →E
7As termed by Francez and Dyckhoﬀ [9, p. 615]. See also [10, p. 17]. Vacuous discharge
is handled by use of Thin.
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Structural Rules
α ⇒ α Ass1
Γ,Θ ⇒ α Θ ⇒ α,Δ ⇒ β
Γ,Δ ⇒ β Slice
Γ ⇒ α
π,Γ ⇒ α Thin
Γ1 ⇒ α1 . . . Γn ⇒ αn
(
⋃n
1 αi) ⇒ β,
⋃n
1 Γi ⇒ β
Ass2
Ass1 is a rule of level 0, Thin, Ass2, ∧I, ∨I1 and ∨I2 are rules of level 1, ∧E1,
∧E2, ∨E and →I are rules of level 2, and Slice and →E are rules of level 3.
The structural rule Ass2 formalizes the introduction of a higher-level
assumption in the course of a derivation, as described in [37, p. 1191]. Sim-
ilarly, Slice can be thought of as a higher-level ‘Cut for sequents’: in light
of Deﬁnition 12 in Section 8 below, we could express Slice as saying that
if Θ ⇒ α is derivable from Γ and Δ ⇒ β is derivable from Θ ⇒ α, then
Δ ⇒ β is derivable from Γ.8
Definition 5. (Derivation) A derivation in S is a ﬁnite tree of sequents in
which every non-initial sequent (that is, any sequent which is not a leaf) is
a consequence by a rule of inference of S of the sequents immediately above
it, and every leaf is the consequence of a rule of S of level 0.
Notation Let Ai,Bi (i ∈ I) be metavariables over derivations. We now show
how to rewrite derivations given in sequent (or logistic) notation in the
perhaps more familiar notation using only wﬀs.
An application of the rule Ass1 may be written simply as
α
If A is a derivation of the sequent α ⇒ β,Γ ⇒ β resulting from the applica-
tion of the rule Ass2 to the terminal node Γ ⇒ α of derivation B, rewritten
as B′, then A may be written as
B′....
β
If A is a derivation of the sequent Γn+1 ⇒ αn+1 resulting from the applica-
tion of a rule J to the terminal nodes Γi ⇒ αi of derivations Bi, rewritten
as B′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then A may be written as
8Slice generalizes Gentzen’s Cut rule to higher-level sequents in a manner not unlike
that in which Cut was a specialization of Hertz’s more general rule Syllogism: see Gentzen’s
discussion in [14, pp. 31–32]. Proposition 1 below shows that Cut (for formulae) is derivable
from Slice.
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B′1 . . . B
′
n
αn+1
J
If the application of J discharges the sequents πi1, . . . , πini in Γi, then A
may be written as
B′′1 . . . B
′′
n
αn+1
J
where each B′′i results from B
′
i by replacing α by [α] if πij , 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, is a
formula α, and replacing
αi1, . . . , αik....
α
by
[
αi1, . . . , αik....
α
]
if πij is a sequent of the form αi1, . . . , αik ⇒ α.
Definition 6. (Derivability) We say that α is derivable from Γ in S, written
Γ 
S α, if there is a derivation in S whose root sequent is Γ′ ⇒ α, where
Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
Proposition 1. The following structural rules are derivable:
1. α ⇒ α,Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ β Refl
2. Γ ⇒ α α,Δ ⇒ β
Γ,Δ ⇒ β Cut
3. Γ ⇒ α β,Δ ⇒ γ
α ⇒ β,Γ,Δ ⇒ γ Trans
Proof. 1. α ⇒ α Ass1 α ⇒ α,Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ β Slice
2.
Δ, α ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α
Γ, α ⇒ β ⇒ β Ass2
Γ,Δ ⇒ β Slice
3. Γ ⇒ α
α ⇒ β,Γ ⇒ β Ass2 β,Δ ⇒ γ
α ⇒ β,Γ,Δ ⇒ γ Cut
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3. General-Elimination Harmony
Now take an arbitrary connective ∗, forming a wﬀ ∗(α1, . . . , αn), for short
∗α, having m I-rules with 0 ≤ j ≤ ni premises, each I-rule ∗Ii (0 ≤ i ≤ m)
of the form (in logistic notation):9
Γi,1,Θi,1 ⇒ αi,1 . . . Γi,ni ,Θi,ni ⇒ αi,ni⋃ni
j=0 Γi,j ⇒ ∗α
∗Ii
The set
⋃ni
j=1 Θi,j (1 ≤ j ≤ ni) is the set of formulae (i.e., sequents of level
1) discharged by the rule. We let Γi,0 = ∅ unless ni = 0.
For each 0 ≤ l ≤ ni, we let
gl(∗Ii) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∅ if l = 0
αi,l if Θi,l = ∅
Θi,l ⇒ αi,l otherwise
The elements in g(∗Ii) =
⋃ni
l=1 gl(∗Ii) are the grounds on which the ith I-rule
permits assertion of ∗α. For example, α is the ground on which ∨I1 permits
assertion of α ∨ β; α ⇒ β is the ground on which →I permits assertion of
α → β.
The GE-procedure developed in [32, p. 563] assigns
∏m
i=1 ni E-rules to
the I-rules for ∗. For each connective, ∗, with m I-rules, let j ∈ ×mi=1ni,
where ×mi=1ni is the set of all functions j with domain {1, . . . ,m}, where
1 ≤ j(i) ≤ ni, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then the jth E-rule has the general-
elimination form:10
Γ ⇒ ∗α Δ1, gj(1)(∗I1) ⇒ γ . . . Δm, gj(m)(∗Im) ⇒ γ
Γ,
⋃m
k=1 Δk ⇒ γ
∗Ej
which we can also write as
∗α
[gj(1)(∗I1)]1
γ . . .
[gj(m)(∗Im)]m
γ
γ ∗Ej(1, . . . ,m)
9See Deﬁnition 3. The format here, requiring ∗α to occur as “terminal symbol” [13,
p. 80] of the I-rule, excludes “general introduction rules” (see [20,22]), where ∗α is also
allowed to occur only as a discharged assumption.
10If ∗ has no I-rules, then g is undeﬁned, so ∗E has no minor premises, whence ∗ is
equivalent to ⊥, whose only E-rule is: Γ ⇒ ⊥Γ ⇒ γ ⊥E. Note that if ∗ has any I-rule with no
premises, then
∏m
i=1 ni = 0, and accordingly, ∗ has no E-rule. In this case, ∗ is equivalent
to , whose I-rule is Γ ⇒  I. See [33, p. 296 n. 5].
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Note that each E-rule discharges, in each minor premise, exactly one of the
grounds of the corresponding I-rule if it has any grounds, and discharges
nothing otherwise.
Dummett’s idea in [4, pp. 396–397] in introducing the notion of “proof-
theoretical harmony”, was to articulate Gentzen’s suggestion that the mean-
ing of a connective encapsulated in its I-rules should justify the inferences
permitted by the E-rules. Harmony requires that the inferences drawn (by
the elimination-rules) from an assertion be “consonant” (loc.cit.) with the
grounds for that assertion (given in the introduction-rules). That each GE-
rule ∗Ej is justiﬁed by the collection of I-rules is shown by a kind of redun-
dancy in the role of ∗α, namely, that whatever can be inferred from ∗α can
already be inferred from one of the grounds for asserting it. The scheme
[Θi,1]1
A1
αi,1 . . .
[Θi,ni ]
ni
Ani
αi,ni
∗α ∗Ii(1, . . . , ni) . . .
[
gj(i)(∗Ii)
]i
Bi
γ . . .
γ ∗Ej(1, . . . ,m)
simpliﬁes to
Θi,j(i)
Ai
αi,j(i)
Bi
γ
However, this glosses over an important distinction as to whether Θi,j(i) is
empty or not. Spelling it out in the more explicit logistic notation, to reveal
the dependencies more clearly, we observe that we can simplify the scheme
A1
Γi,1, Θi,1 ⇒ αi,1 . . .
Ani
Γi,ni , Θi,ni ⇒ αi,ni⋃ni
k=1 Γi,k ⇒ ∗α
∗Ii B1
Δ1, gj(1)(∗I1) ⇒ γ . . .
Bm
Δm, gj(m)(∗Im) ⇒ γ
⋃ni
k=1 Γi,k,
⋃m
l=1 Δl ⇒ γ
∗Ej
by taking the ith minor premise of the application of ∗Ej together with the
j(i)th premise of ∗Ii and applying either Cut or Slice:
Aj(1)
Γi,j(i),Θi,j(i) ⇒ αi,j(i)
Bi
Δi, gj(i)(∗Ii) ⇒ γ
Γi,j(i),Δi ⇒ γ Cut/Slice⋃ni
k=1 Γi,k,
⋃m
l=1 Δl ⇒ γ
Thin
since either
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• Θi,j(i) = ∅, in which case gj(i)(∗Ii) = αi,j(i) and we apply Cut, or
• Θi,j(i) = ∅, in which case gj(i)(∗Ii) = Θi,j(i) ⇒ αi,j(i) and we apply
Slice.11
The existence of such a reduction shows that whatever follows from ∗α al-
ready follows from what justiﬁed its assertion in the ﬁrst place. The E-rules
draw no conclusion not already warranted by the grounds for asserting ∗α.
Accordingly, the GE-rules generated by the GE-procedure lie in harmony
with the I-rules—they exhibit what in [9] is called “general-elimination har-
mony”.12
To take an example, for the harmony of ∨I and ∨E we show that we
can close the assumptions of α and of β by the grounds for their assertion,
instead of discharging them by the application of ∨E:
A
α
α ∨ β ∨I
[α]1
B1
γ
[β]2
B2
γ
γ ∨E(1, 2)
reduces to
A
α
B1
γ
Similarly, we show the harmony of →I and →E by closing the assumption
of α ⇒ β by replacing it by a derivation of β dependent on α which justiﬁes
the assertion of α → β, rather than by discharging the assumption of α ⇒ β
through →E:
[α]1
A1
β
α → β → I(1)
⎡
⎢⎣
α
...
β
⎤
⎥⎦
2
A2
γ
γ →E(2)
reduces to
α
A1
β
A2
γ
11In general, in the presence of other connectives, we may need to perform so-called
permutative reductions to permute the application of ∗Ej with other E-rules to bring ∗Ii
and ∗Ej into contact. See, e.g., [5, p. 112], [6, p. 250], [42, Sect. 2] and [34, Sect. 2]. It will,
of course, be necessary to show, in any particular logic, that the result of simpliﬁcation
is still a correct derivation, which will depend inter alia on the conditions on discharge
of assumptions and on the satisfaction of side conditions. Note that the GE-procedure is
deﬁned only for I-rules whose parametric assumptions have no side conditions. See Sections
8 and 9 below for a discussion of I- and E-rules with side conditions.
12For further details, see [28,29,32]. The general-elimination procedure proposed in [9]
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that given here.
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In the more explicit logistic notation, it reads:
A1
Γ, α ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α → β → I
A2
Δ, α ⇒ β ⇒ γ
Γ,Δ ⇒ γ → E
which reduces to
A1
Γ, α ⇒ β
A2
Δ, α ⇒ β ⇒ γ
Γ,Δ ⇒ γ Slice
Thus an assumption can be closed in two diﬀerent ways: by discharging it
by the application of a rule, or by establishing it by means of a derivation.
In fact, →E is not as unfamiliar as it may seem. Letting γ = β, we obtain
as a special case a derivation of β from α → β and α:
α → β
⎡
⎢⎣
α
...
β
⎤
⎥⎦
1
β
→E(1)
or more explicitly in the logistic notation:
α → β ⇒ α → β Ass1
α ⇒ α Ass1
α, α ⇒ β ⇒ β Ass2
α, α → β ⇒ β →E
conﬁrming that the undischarged assumptions are α → β and α.13 This
simpliﬁes to the familiar Modus (Ponendo) Ponens:
α → β α
β
MPP that is,
Γ ⇒ α → β Δ ⇒ α
Γ,Δ ⇒ β
by two applications of Cut:
Δ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α → β
. . .
α, α → β ⇒ β (as above)
Γ, α ⇒ β Cut
Γ,Δ ⇒ β Cut
Thus MPP is a special case of →E. →E tells us that since β follows from α
and α ⇒ β, then it follows from α and α → β.
13This derivation of β from α → β and α can already be found, with slightly diﬀerent
notation, in [35, p. 1295]. See also [31, Sect. 2.4].
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Conversely, MPP justiﬁes →E as follows: given the premises of →E,
namely,
α → β and
α
...
β
A
γ
or in the explicit notation
Γ ⇒ α → β and
A
Δ, α ⇒ β ⇒ γ
we can replace the assumption of α ⇒ β by an actual derivation of β de-
pendent on α and α → β by MPP, and proceed to γ:
α → β α
β
MPP
A
γ
that is,
Γ ⇒ α → β α ⇒ α Ass1
Γ, α ⇒ β MPP
A
Δ, α ⇒ β ⇒ γ
Γ,Δ ⇒ γ Slice
4. General-Elimination Stability
Dummett [6, p. 287] remarks that:
Harmony is an excessively modest demand . . . It does not show that
. . . we are accustomed to draw all those consequences we should be
entitled to draw.
He proposed that not only should the E-rules be justiﬁed by the I-rules, but
conversely, the I-rules should be seen as justiﬁed by the E-rules. The E-rules
are in harmony with the I-rules when we cannot infer more by the E-rules
than is warranted by the I-rules; conversely, the I-rules are in harmony with
the E-rules when they allow one to assert no more than is warranted by the
inferences drawn by the E-rules. Dummett described the rules as “stable”
when the rules form a perfect circle, so that starting with the I-rules, forming
the E-rules that they warrant, and from there forming the I-rules that these
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E-rules warrant in turn, one returns to the original I-rules; and similarly,
if starting with the E-rules, and performing both justiﬁcation procedures,
one arrives back at the original E-rules.14 Consequently, stability ensures
that not only do the E-rules allow one to infer no more than is justiﬁed
by the meaning conferred by the I-rules, they permit one to infer no less
than is so justiﬁed. Stability ensures the consonance behind the original
conception of harmony.15 We will say that the E-rules for a connective are
“inversely harmonious” (relative to a set of I-rules) when the I-rules for
the connective are harmonious with respect to those E-rules, and so when
the I-rules allow one to infer nothing more than is warranted by the E-
rules. A collection of I- and E-rules is stable just when the E-rules are both
harmonious and inversely harmonious.
Establishing stability lay behind Lorenzen’s inversion principle:
A general formulation of an ‘inversion principle’ would be, e.g.: given
a system of rules such that for the derivation of an expression p0 only
the rules
p1 → p0; . . . ; pn → p0
(possibly containing bound variables) are needed, then for every ex-
pression p, in which certain variables do not occur free, the meta-rule
[p1 → p; . . . ; pn → p] → (p0 → p)
is valid.16
14Dyckhoﬀ and Francez [9, p. 614] (see also [10, p. 80]) and Schroeder-Heister [37,
p. 1205] interpret Dummett’s remark [6, p. 287], “the demand that such a condition be
met goes beyond the requirement of harmony: we may call it ‘stability’,” to refer to the
converse of harmony, whereby the I-rules are justiﬁed by the meaning conferred by the
E-rules. But Dummett applies the term ‘harmony’ to both justiﬁcation procedures. It is
when the procedures bring one back full circle that, for Dummett, we have stability. He
writes (loc.cit.): “to verify that stability obtains, we have to appeal to both justiﬁcation
procedures.”
15See also [44, p. 506], where it is proposed that the E-rules “stabilize or delimit the
meaning of the logical constant concerned, by saying, in eﬀect, of the given I-rules: ‘These
are the only ways in which this constant can be introduced’.”
16“Eine allgemeine Formulierung eines ‘Inversionsprinzips’ wa¨re etwa: Ist ein System
von Regeln vorgegeben, so daß zur Ableitung einer Aussage p0 nur die Regeln p1 →
p0; . . . ; pn → p0 (evtl. mit gebundenen Variablen) benutzt werden ko¨nnen, so gilt fu¨r jede
Aussage p, in der gewisse Variable nicht frei vorkommen, die Metaregel p1 → p; . . . ; pn →
p
.→ p0 → p.” [18, p. 176] In [19, Sect. 1.4], Lorenzen attempted to spell out the necessary
conditions on the bound variables, later corrected by Hermes in [15]. See also [36, Sect. 4].
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That is, whatever follows from the direct grounds for the assertion of a
proposition alone must follow from that proposition. This is a statement of
inverse harmony.
Prawitz also formulated an inversion principle. He wrote:
Observe that an elimination rule is, in a sense, the inverse of the
corresponding introduction rule: by an application of an elimination
rule one essentially only restores what had already been established if
the major premiss of the application was inferred by an application of
an introduction rule. [26, p. 33]
Thus, according to Prawitz’s inversion principle, whatever follows from an
assertion must follow from the direct grounds for that assertion. This is a
statement of harmony.
Negri and von Plato claim to follow Gentzen and Prawitz in formulating
their “general inversion principle”:
Whatever follows from the direct grounds for deriving a proposition
must follow from that proposition. ([22, p. 6]; cf. [23, p. 243])
Moriconi and Tesconi [21, p. 111] comment that Negri and von Plato’s prin-
ciple is the very opposite of Prawitz’s inversion principle, and remark that,
in point of fact, Negri and von Plato’s “general inversion principle is very
akin to Lorenzen’s meta-rule”.
What primarily concerns Lorenzen is the “completeness” of the E-rules.
As quoted above, he wrote: “[if] for the derivation of an expression p0 only
[such and such] rules . . . are needed, then for every expression p, the meta-
rule . . . is valid.” (Our emphases.) Putting Prawitz’s and Lorenzen’s prin-
ciples together, we have the demand for stability. As Moriconi and Tesconi
put it:
Moreover, considered together with the (‘suﬃciency’-)condition sta-
ted by Lorenzen’s meta-rule [“the task of generating (the strongest)
elimination rule”—p. 108], the above (‘necessity’-condition) [that no
more follows from A than from its grounds] not only justiﬁes but also
determines a set of elimination rules. In fact, the two conditions are
the same as saying that from a proposition A exactly the same thing
follows as follows its immediate grounds. [21, p. 110]
Lorenzen’s inversion principle, designed to establish “completeness”, in other
words, inverse harmony, thus completes the circle that Dummett used to
deﬁne stability.
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We have already seen that the E-rules generated by the general-elimi-
nation procedure are harmonious relative to the I-rules from which they are
generated. Our aim is to show what we will call ‘general-elimination stabil-
ity’, that the GE-procedure in fact generates a stable set of E-rules from
an arbitrary collection of I-rules. The E-rules generated by the procedure
allow one to infer everything warranted by the I-rules from which they are
generated, and nothing more.
Prawitz [27, p. 246] conjectured that his rules for minimal logic were
stable:
Conjecture: The set of inference rules derivable in M is the maxi-
mum set of inference rules which is valid with respect to some justifi-
cation J .
We will show that the GE-rules are inversely harmonious (relative to the
I-rules from which they are generated) and so, since they are harmonious,
they are stable, thus establishing Prawitz’s conjecture for M, indeed, for all
the systems S of Section 2.
We consider four formal properties of E-rules with the aim of variously
capturing the notion of inverse harmony in a formal manner, and show that
GE-rules satisfy all the properties considered. The ﬁrst property, considered
in Section 5, is called “local completeness” in [25]. Roughly, the E-rules for a
connective ∗ are locally complete just in case there is a proof of each formula
∗α from itself only by applications of all the I-rules and non-vacuous appli-
cations of all the E-rules for ∗. We consider a diﬀerent property of E-rules in
Section 6, based on Schroeder-Heister and Olkhovikov’s idea ([38,39]) of the
introduction-meaning and the elimination-meaning of a connective. The I-
and E-meanings of a connective are metalinguistic formulae expressing the
meaning conferred on a connective by the set of I- and E-rules, respectively.
The formal property proposed in Section 6 to capture inverse harmony is the
property that the E-rules for a connective have when its E-meaning implies
its I-meaning.
But in Section 7 we cast doubt on whether the properties proposed in
Sections 5 and 6 really do capture inverse harmony. For the E-rules for
quantum disjunction are locally complete with respect to the I-rules for
disjunction and quantum disjunction’s I- and E-meanings are equivalent.
Given the weakness of quantum disjunction, these results cast doubt on
whether the properties of local completeness and implication of I-meanings
by E-meanings do succeed in formally capturing inverse harmony.
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In Section 8 we consider the property of the E-rules for a connective ∗
whereby one can, by application of the E-rules for ∗, derive the grounds
for asserting ∗α from ∗α itself, but give reasons to think that this property
also fails to capture the notion of inverse harmony successfully. Finally, in
Section 9 we introduce the idea of generalized local completeness. As the
name indicates, generalized local completeness is a generalization of local
completeness. Showing that the GE-rules satisfy generalized local complete-
ness, we propose that this property successfully captures the informal notion
of inverse harmony. We conclude that the GE-procedure does indeed gen-
erate stable rules, thus fulﬁlling Gentzen’s aim of displaying the E-rules as
unique functions of the I-rules, and conﬁrming Prawitz’s Conjecture for all
the systems S of Section 2.
5. Local Completeness
The requirement that “we can apply the E-rules to a judgment to recover
enough knowledge to permit reconstruction of the original judgment” is
called “local completeness” by Pfenning and Davies [25, p. 513].17 That
way, they say, the E-rules will be “suﬃciently strong”.
If taken literally, it is hard to see how this “expansion” can be available
in general. The formula α ∨ β is an obvious counterexample: one cannot
in general recover α ∨ β after applying ∨E to α ∨ β. However, Pfenning
and Davies’ subsequent discussion of α and their argument for the local
completeness of their rules for ‘’ [25, p. 518] (see also [3, pp. 561–562])
show that they would accept the following expansion as showing the local
completeness of the rules for ‘∨’:18
α ∨ β
[α]1
α ∨ β ∨I
[β]2
α ∨ β ∨I
α ∨ β ∨E(1, 2)
Dyckhoﬀ and Francez [9, p. 623 n.] write:
Conjunction expansion and disjunction expansion . . . exhibit diﬀerent
relative ordering of I-rules and E-rules application.
In fact, a conjunctive expansion can be carried out in either order, I- before
E- or E- before I-. But disjunctive expansion, and in general the expansion
17Local completeness is also discussed in [3].
18The disjunctive expansion is given explicitly in [9, p. 624] and in [10, p. 108].
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with respect to any formula constructed with a connective with more than
one I-rule, can only be achieved by applying the I-rules before, or subordi-
nately to, the E-rules.
Let us make this precise:
Definition 7. (Local completeness) We take the E-rules for a connective
∗ to be locally complete just in case, for any α, there is a derivation of
∗α depending solely on ∗α and obtained only by applications of the rule
of assumptions (i.e., of the structural rules Ass1 and Ass2 in Section 2),
applications of all the I-rules for ∗, and applications of all the E-rules for ∗,
and having ∗α as its only undischarged assumption.19
Local completeness is our ﬁrst attempt to capture the property of inverse
harmony formally. As we now show, any connective with I- and E-rules
framed according to the general-elimination procedure admits an expansion
of the form previously described.
Theorem 1. (Local Completeness) Let ∗ be an n-ary connective, for any
n ∈ N, governed by a set of introduction- and general-elimination-rules as
above. Then there is a derivation of ∗α (in any system S of the sort defined in
Sections 2 and 3 containing the I- and GE-rules for ∗), for any α, depending
solely on ∗α and obtained only by applications of the rules Ass1, Ass2, all
the I-rules for ∗ and all the general-elimination rules for ∗.
The general strategy is to provide a recipe for constructing a deriva-
tion of ∗α from undischarged assumptions of ∗α.20 The recipe appeals to a
function Pf () from a class of m-tuples (understood as functions with domain
{1, 2, . . . ,m}), technically representing the E-rules for ∗, to the set of deriva-
tions. For each such m-tuple j, Pf (j) outputs a derivation of ∗α from ∗α,
and possibly other open assumptions, in which every I-rule for ∗ is applied,
as well as every E-rule for ∗ lexicographically less than or equal to the rule
corresponding to j. When j corresponds to the ﬁnal E-rule for ∗, Pf (j) is a
derivation of ∗α from ∗α without any other open assumptions.
Proof. There are three cases to consider, namely, i) when there are no
I-rules; ii) when there is an I-rule with no premises; and iii) when all the
19Of course, there is vacuously an expansion consisting of ∗α itself, with no applications
of ∗I or ∗E.
20The strategy is rather diﬀerent from that suggested by Dyckhoﬀ and Francez in
the proof-sketch in [9, p. 625] for their diﬀerent version of the E-rules. However, their
construction, applying E-rules before I-rules, does not seem to cover connectives like ‘∨’.
Nor can their sketch be ﬁlled out to establish local completeness for certain of their GE-
rules, as shown in [33,39]. See [10, p. 103] and Section 6 below.
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I-rules have at least one premise. If there are no I-rules, then (as noted in
footnote 10 above) ∗ is ‘⊥’ and we have the following derivation:
⊥ ⇒ ⊥ Ass1
⊥ ⇒ ⊥ ⊥E
If there is one I-rule with no assumptions, then (again as noted in footnote
10 above), ∗ is ‘’, it has only one I-rule and no GE-rules, and we have the
following derivation:
 ⇒  I
If all the I-rules have at least one premise, assume without loss of gener-
ality that ∗ has m I-rules, where each I-rule ∗Ii has ni premises, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
ni ≥ 1.
Definition 8. Let
• end(A) be the end sequent of derivation A
• Ω = ×mi=1ni
• For each j ∈ Ω, 1 ≤ i ≤ m: ξij(k) =
{
j(k) if k = i,
0 if k = i
• Ξ = ⋃j∈Ω
⋃m
i=1{ξij}
• Ω+ = Ω ∪ Ξ
• For each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ m, δi : Ω → Ω+ such that
δi(j)(k) =
{
j(k) if k = i
j(i) − 1 if k = i
• Ωm = 〈n1, . . . , nm〉.
Each function j ∈ Ω represents the corresponding rule ∗Ej . Moreover,
each function ξij ∈ Ξ represents the rule ∗Ii, as determined as a function
of j. The function Pf () previously mentioned associates with each rule ∗Ej
a derivation Pf (j) whose last step is an application of ∗Ej . The ith minor
premise of this application of ∗Ej is a derivation whose last step is the rule
represented by δi(j). Thus, the role of δ is to determine the rule that is
the last step of the ith premise of the application of ∗Ej in Pf (j). This
will become clearer when we introduce the function Pf () in Deﬁnition 10
below. If i − 1 = 0, then δi(j) represents the rule ∗Eδi(j) that discharges
all the same assumptions as ∗Ej except the ith, discharging the (i − 1)th
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assumption instead. If i − 1 = 0, then δi(j) = ξij , and so δi(j) represents
the rule ∗Ii.
Note that, like j itself, δi(j) is also a function with domain {1, . . . ,m}, so
on occasion we will write δi(j) as δij . The m-tuple Ωm is the last function of
Ω according to Ω’s lexicographical ordering, and so Ωm represents the last
of ∗’s E-rules given the ordering of ∗’s E-rules based on the lexicographical
ordering of Ω.
Definition 9. Let η be a function mapping sequents π of level 1 or 2 to
derivations in any system S such that if π is a formula α, then η(π) is the
derivation
α ⇒ α Ass1
and if π is a sequent β1, . . . , βn ⇒ α, then η(π) is the derivation
β1 ⇒ β1 Ass1 . . . βn ⇒ βn Ass1
β1, . . . , βn ⇒ α, β1, . . . , βn ⇒ α Ass2
The function η() will be used to generate derivations of sequents suitable
for the application of the I-rules of ∗ from the grounds for introducing ∗. If
a ground gl(∗Ii) is simply a formula α, then η(gl(∗Ii)) is a derivation of α
from itself. And if gl(∗Ii) is the sequent β1, . . . , βn ⇒ α, then η(gl(∗Ii)) is
a derivation of the sequent with succedent α, the succedent of gl(∗Ii), and
antecedents β1, . . . , βn ⇒ α, the ground gl(∗Ii) itself, as well as β1, . . . , βn,
the ground’s antecedents.
Definition 10. For each j ∈ Ω+, and where l ∈ Ω, let:
Pf (j) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
η(g1(∗Ii)) . . . η(gni(∗Ii))⋃ni
k=1 gk(∗Ii) ⇒ ∗α
∗Ii if j = ξil ∈ Ξ
∗α ⇒ ∗α Ass1 Pf (δ1(j)) . . . Pf (δm(j))⋃m
i=1
⋃ni
k=j(i)+1 gk(∗Ii), ∗α ⇒ ∗α
∗Ej if j ∈ Ω
The function Pf () is used to generate the required derivation of ∗α ⇒ ∗α.
The function’s role may be understood by considering how to construct a
derivation of ∗α ⇒ ∗α witnessing the claim made in Theorem 1. The bottom
node, ∗α ⇒ ∗α, is obtained by an application of ∗EΩm , the last of the E-rules
according to the lexicographical ordering on Ω. The ith minor premise of
the application of ∗EΩm is a derivation of a sequent πδiΩm whose succedent
is ∗α and whose antecedents are ∗α and the ground gΩm(i)(∗Ii), which is
discharged by ∗EΩm .
The sequent πδiΩm is obtained by an application of the E-rule ∗EδiΩm ‘im-
mediately’ before ∗EΩm with respect to i, in the sense that ∗EδiΩm discharges
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all of the assumptions discharged by ∗EΩm , except that it does not discharge
the ground gΩm(i)(∗Ii). Rather, it discharges the ground gΩm(i)−1(∗Ii). We
construct the derivation tree in this way, that is, by inserting an application
of the E-rule ∗Eδij in the ith minor premise of the application of the E-rule
∗Ej . The end sequent πδij of the application of ∗Eδij has ∗α as its succedent
and the antecedents of πδij are the antecedents of πj (i.e., the antecedents
of the end sequent of the application of ∗Ej), plus the ground gj(i)(∗Ii),
which gets discharged by the application of ∗Ej immediately below in the
derivation.
Constructing the derivation tree in this bottom-up way, inserting an ap-
plication of the E-rule ∗Eδij in the ith minor premise of the application of
the E-rule ∗Ej , eventually we reach the case when j(i)− 1 = 0. In this case,
δij ∈ Ω, and so one cannot place an application of an E-rule for ∗ as the ith
minor premise of ∗Ej , as there is no such rule ∗Eδij . Rather, δij = ξij , and
so what gets placed as the ith minor premise of the application of ∗Ej is an
application of ∗Ii.
The premises of this application of ∗Ii are η(gk(∗Ii)), 1 ≤ k ≤ ni. The
succedent of the end sequent of the application of ∗Ii is ∗α and the an-
tecedents of the end sequent of the application of ∗Ii are the grounds gk(∗Ii),
for all k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ ni. These were the assumptions that were getting
discharged by the applications of the E-rules for ∗ as we went further up in
the construction of the derivation tree, following the ith minor premise of
each application of the E-rule below.
To see why the antecedents of the end sequent of the application of ∗Ii
are exactly the grounds gk(∗Ii), for all k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, note that:
(i) if gk(∗Ii) is a formula, then this formula is the only antecedent of the
end sequent of η(gk(∗Ii)), and so it is the only sequent that is carried
from the antecedent of the end sequent of η(gk(∗Ii)) to the antecedent
of the end sequent of the application of ∗Ii; and
(ii) if gk(∗Ii) is β1, . . . , βn ⇒ α, then the antecedents of the end sequent
of η(gk(∗Ii)) are gk(∗Ii) and β1, . . . , βn. Since an application of ∗Ii dis-
charges β1, . . . , βn, the only sequent in the antecedent of the end sequent
of η(gk(∗Ii)) that is carried to the antecedents of the end sequent of the
application of ∗Ii is gk(∗Ii).
So, the antecedents of the end sequent of the application of ∗Ii are exactly
the grounds gk(∗Ii), for all k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ ni. Thus, starting with an
application of ∗EΩm one can construct a derivation of ∗α ⇒ ∗α, by following
each minor premise i of the application ∗Ej in the way just described. This
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procedure is captured by the function Pf (). One starts bottom up with
Pf (Ωm), and then applies Pf () to the elements in Ω less than or equal to
Ωm.
We establish two general results about the function Pf ().
Lemma 1. Pf (j) is a derivation in S, for each j ∈ Ω+ and system S of the
kind defined in Section 2 containing the I- and GE-rules for ∗.
Proof. (Lemma 1) The proof is by well-founded induction on Ω+. So,
consider ﬁrst the case where j ∈ Ξ = Ω+ − Ω. Let A be the derivation
obtained by applying ∗Ii to end(η(g1(∗Ii)), . . . , end(η(gni(∗Ii)). It will be
shown that a(end(A)) = a(end(Pf (j))) and s(end(A)) = s(end(Pf (j))),
and so that Pf (j) = A.
Since, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, s(end(η(gk(∗Ii)))) = s(gk(∗Ii)), it follows
that s(end(A)) = ∗α = s(end(Pf (j))). Moreover, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ ni:
a(end(η(gk(∗Ii)))) = gk(∗Ii) if gk(∗Ii) is a sequent of level 1, and
a(end(η(gk(∗Ii)))) = gk(∗Ii), a(gk(∗Ii))
if gk(∗Ii) is a sequent of level 2. Note that, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, a(gk(∗Ii))
is discharged by ∗Ii. So, a(end(A)) =
⋃ni
k=1 gk(∗Ii) = a(end(Pf (j))). There-
fore, if j ∈ Ξ, then Pf (j) is a derivation in S.
For the case of j ∈ Ω, assume that Pf (δi(j)) are derivations, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, and let A be the derivation obtained by applying ∗Ej to
end(Pf (δ1(j))), . . . , end(Pf (δm(j)))
as minor premises. Clearly, s(end(Pf (δi(j)))) = ∗α, by the deﬁnition of Pf ().
So s(end(A)) = ∗α = s(end(Pf (j))) since the last step of A consists in an
application of ∗Ej .
If δij ∈ Ξ, then j(i) = 1, δij = ξij and so a(end(Pf (δij))) =
⋃ni
k=1 gk(∗Ii)
by the deﬁnition of Pf (). Thus,
a(end(Pf (δi(j)))) − gj(i)(∗Ii) =
ni⋃
k=j(i)+1
gk(∗Ii)
If δij ∈ Ω, then
δij =
{
j(l) if l = i
j(i) − 1 if l = i
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and so, by the deﬁnition of Pf (),
a(end(Pf (δij))) =
⋃
l =i
nl⋃
k=j(l)+1
gk(∗Il) ∪
ni⋃
k=j(i)
gk(∗Ii), ∗α
Thus, a(end(Pf (δij))) − gj(i)(∗Ii) =
⋃m
i=1
⋃ni
k=j(i)+1 gk(∗Ii). Since the last
step of A consists in an application of ∗Ej we have that:
a(end(A)) =
m⋃
i=1
(a(end(Pf (δij))) − gj(i)(∗Ii)), ∗α
=
m⋃
i=1
ni⋃
k=j(i)+1
gk(∗Ii), ∗α
= a(end(Pf (j)))
Hence, if j ∈ Ω, then Pf (j) is a derivation in S. Therefore, for all j ∈ Ω+,
Pf (j) is a derivation in S.
Lemma 2. ∀j, j′ ∈ Ω s.t. j′ ≤ j: ∗Ej′ is used in Pf (j).
Proof. (Lemma 2) We prove the result by well-founded induction on Ω.
Suppose that ∀j′ ∈ Ω s.t. j′ < j: ∀f ∈ Ω s.t. f ≤ j′: ∗Ef is used in Pf (j′).
We show that ∀j′ ∈ Ω s.t. j′ ≤ j: ∗Ej′ is used in Pf (j).
Take an arbitrary j′ ∈ Ω s.t. j′ ≤ j. If j′ = j, then it is clear that ∗Ej′
is used in Pf (j). Suppose instead that j′ = j. Then, ∃i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
j′ ≤ δij . It follows from the I.H. that ∗Ej′ is used in Pf (δi(j)). Hence, ∗Ej′
is used in Pf (j).
Now, note that Ωm(i) = ni, and so
ni⋃
k=Ωm(i)+1
gk(∗Ii) =
ni⋃
k=ni+1
gk(∗Ii) = ∅
which means that
m⋃
i=1
ni⋃
k=Ωm(i)+1
gk(∗Ii) = ∅.
So
Pf (Ωm) =
∗α ⇒ ∗α Ass1 Pf (δ1(Ωm)) . . . Pf (δm(Ωm))
∗α ⇒ ∗α ∗EΩm
From Lemma 1 it follows that Pf (Ωm) is indeed a derivation. Note that all
the I-rules for ∗ are used in Pf (π1), where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, π1(i) = 0,
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if ∗Ii has no premises, and otherwise π1(i) = 1. Note also that, for every
j′, j ∈ Ω, if ∗Ej′ is used in Pf (j) then Pf (j) has Pf (j′) as a sub-proof, by
construction of Pf (). Thus, by Lemma 2, Pf (π1) is a sub-proof of Pf (Ωm),
since ∀j ∈ Ω: π1 ≤ j, which means that all the I-rules for ∗ are used in
Pf (Ωm). From Lemma 2 it follows that every elimination rule for ∗ is used
in Pf (Ωm). Therefore, Pf (Ωm) is a proof of ∗α from ∗α obtained only by
applications of the rules Ass1, Ass2, and applications of all the I-rules for
∗ and of all the general-elimination rules for ∗. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
As an example (given in the more familiar notation using only wﬀs),
consider the following 6-place connective ‘∇’, with introduction rules:
[
]1
α β
∇(
, α, β, γ, ξ, ζ) ∇I1 and
γ ξ ζ
∇(
, α, β, γ, ξ, ζ) ∇I2
The I-rules for ‘∇’ generate the following six GE-rules. Recall the formula
from Section 3: m = 2, n1 = 2 and n2 = 3, so
∏m
i=1 ni = 6, thus ensuring
that the assumption of one premise from each I-rule is discharged by each
E-rule (where ‘∇’ abbreviates ‘∇(
, α, β, γ, ξ, ζ)’):
∇
⎡
⎢⎣


...
α
⎤
⎥⎦
1
ψ
[γ]2
ψ
ψ
∇E1(1, 2) ∇
⎡
⎢⎣


...
α
⎤
⎥⎦
1
ψ
[ξ]2
ψ
ψ
∇E2(1, 2)
∇
⎡
⎢⎣


...
α
⎤
⎥⎦
1
ψ
[ζ]2
ψ
ψ
∇E3(1, 2) ∇
[β]1
ψ
[γ]2
ψ
ψ
∇E4(1, 2)
∇
[β]1
ψ
[ξ]2
ψ
ψ
∇E5(1, 2) ∇
[β]1
ψ
[ζ]2
ψ
ψ
∇E6(1, 2)
To elucidate how the function Pf () used in the proof of Theorem 1 works, we
provide the derivation Pf (〈2, 3〉) in Figure 1, with subproofs Pf (〈1, 3〉) and
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Figure 1. Pf (〈2, 3〉)
Figure 2. Pf (〈1, 3〉)
Figure 3. Pf (〈2, 2〉)
Pf (〈2, 2〉) in Figures 2 and 3. Note that each sub-proof ending in the applica-
tion of an E-rule discharging premises (l1, r2) corresponds to the derivation
Pf (〈l, r〉).
Given this result, if local completeness does successfully capture inverse
harmony, then the GE-rules for any connective are inversely harmonious,
and a fortiori stable, with respect to the I-rules from which they are gener-
ated. But we will question this assumption in Section 7.
6. Introduction- and Elimination-Meaning
Schroeder-Heister [38] (see also [39]) introduces the idea of the introduction-
meaning and the elimination-meaning of a connective, that is, of formulae
which express the meaning conferred on a connective by a set of, respec-
tively, I- and E-rules. He proposes an account of stability (which he calls
“harmony”: [38, p. 339]), according to which a connective has stable I- and
E-rules if and only if its I- and E-meanings are equivalent.
Schroeder-Heister describes this approach as “reductive”, in contrast to
the “foundational” approach taken in [37]. The reductive approach is so
called because it involves, in some sense, a reduction of the meaning of a
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connective to the meaning of the expressions used in the formulation of its
I- and E-meanings.
Our project in the present paper is to determine whether the I- and GE-
rules for a connective are stable, independently of whether this is achieved by
appealing to the meanings of expressions of some language or other. What
makes a real distinction between our projects is (as noted in [38, p. 330]) that
we are interested in the stability of I- and E-rules where the latter are gen-
erated from the former via the GE-procedure, whereas Schroeder-Heister’s
interest is in the relationship between I- and E-rules in general. Schroeder-
Heister’s speciﬁc formulation of I- and E-meanings concerns (second-order)
intuitionistic logic. However, it readily generalizes to other logics and their
higher-order counterparts.
These (meta-)formulae belong to a basic vocabulary expressing the cen-
tral idea of alternative, jointly suﬃcient and possibly conditional grounds.
In the case of ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’ and ‘⊥’, for example, the I-meaning is simply
expressed by the (metalinguistic) formulae α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α → β and ⊥,
respectively.
Now consider the connective ‘◦’ discussed in [44, p. 506] and [38, p. 345],
with I-rules:
[α]1
β
◦(α, β, γ) ◦I1(1) and
γ
◦(α, β, γ) ◦I2
Then ◦(α, β, γ) can be asserted either if α implies β or if γ obtains, so the
I-meaning of ◦(α, β, γ) is given by the meta-formula (α → β)∨γ. In general,
the I-meaning of ∗ given by the schematic I-rules in Section 3 is
m∨
i=1
ni∧
l=0
c
(
gl(∗Ii)
)
where
c(gl(∗Ii)) =
{
gl(∗Ii) if gl(∗Ii) is a level 1 sequent and∧
a(gl(∗Ii)) → s(gl(∗Ii)) if gl(∗Ii) is a level 2 sequent.21
What of the E-meaning of ∗? First, recall the application of the general-
elimination procedure to the case of implication, ‘→’, given in Sections 1
and 3 above:
21This account of the I-meaning can already be found in [44, p. 505]. For the case m = 0,
see footnote 22. If l = 0, then gl(∗Ii) = ∅ in which case we let c(∅) =  (:= ⊥ → ⊥).
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α → β
⎡
⎢⎣
α
...
β
⎤
⎥⎦
1
γ
γ →E(1)
The E-meaning is given not by the grounds for assertion of α → β (that is,
α ⇒ β), but in terms of what can be inferred from those grounds, which
is anything which follows from the sequent α ⇒ β. Thus the E-meaning of
α → β is represented by the second-order formula:
(∀ζ)
((
(α → β) → ζ) → ζ
)
,
that is, if α implies β only if ζ, then ζ, for any ζ.
Now consider ◦(α, β, γ) again. Since in its I-rule, m = 2 and n1 = n2 = 1,
it follows that
∏m
i=1 ni = 1, and so the rules ◦I1 and ◦I2 generate one GE-
rule:
◦(α, β, γ)
⎡
⎢⎣
α
...
β
⎤
⎥⎦
1
ζ
[γ]2
ζ
ζ
◦E(1, 2)
Once again, the E-meaning is given in terms of what can be inferred from
the grounds for asserting ◦(α, β, γ), that is, whatever follows both from the
sequent α ⇒ β and from γ. Thus the E-meaning of ◦(α, β, γ) is represented
by the second-order formula:
(∀ζ)
( ((
(α → β) → ζ) ∧ (γ → ζ)) → ζ
)
,
that is, if α implies β only if ζ, and moreover γ holds only if ζ, then ζ,
for any ζ. More generally, the E-meaning of ∗ as given by the ∗E-rules of
Section 3 is:
∧
j∈Ω
(∀ζ)(
m∧
i=1
(c(gj(i)(∗Ii)) → ζ) → ζ)
where, as in Section 5, Ω = ×mi=1ni, that is, the set of m-tuples j whose ith
member j(i) ≤ ni.22
22When there is no I-rule (i.e., m = 0),
∏0
i=1 ni = 1 and ∗α = ⊥ (see footnote 10).
Then
∧m
i=1(c(g1(∗Ii)) → ζ) is empty. Since, by convention, the empty conjunction is ,
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The property that the E-rules for a connective ∗ have when the E-meaning
for ∗ implies the I-meaning for ∗ provides an alternative way of formally
capturing the notion of inverse harmony. For example, (∀ζ)(((α → ζ)∧(β →
ζ)) → ζ), the E-meaning of ‘∨’, implies α ∨ β, the I-meaning of ‘∨’, and the
E-meaning of ‘◦’, (∀ζ)((((α → β) → ζ)∧(γ → ζ)) → ζ), implies (α → β)∨γ,
the I-meaning of ‘◦’.
In fact, the I- and E-meanings of both ‘∨’ and ‘◦’ are equivalent. In gen-
eral, we can show that the E-meanings given by the GE-rules are equivalent
to the I-meanings of the set of I-rules from which they are generated:
Theorem 2. (Equivalence of I- and E-meanings) The E-meanings given by
the GE-rules are equivalent to the I-meanings of the sets of I-rules which
generate them.
Proof. we show that
m∨
i=1
ni∧
l=0
c
(
gl(∗Ii)
)
↔
∧
j∈Ω
(∀ζ)
(
m∧
i=1
(
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
) → ζ
)
→ ζ
)
Left-to-right: Clearly,
c
(
gl(∗Ii)
)
→
(
m∧
i=1
(
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
) → ζ
)
→ ζ
)
for any ζ, where j(i) = l ≤ ni, and so
ni∧
l=0
c
(
gl(∗Ii)
)
→ (∀ζ)
(
m∧
i=1
(
c(gj(i) (∗Ii)) → ζ
)
→ ζ
)
for every j ∈ Ω. Hence
ni∧
l=0
c(gl(∗Ii)) →
∧
j∈Ω
(∀ζ)
(
m∧
i=1
(
c(gj(i)(∗Ii)) → ζ
)
→ ζ
)
for every i. The result follows by ∨E.
Right-to-left: Suppose
∧
j∈Ω(∀ζ)(
∧m
i=1(c(gj(i)(∗Ii)) → ζ) → ζ). Then,
by ∧E and ∀E,
m∧
i=1
(
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
) →
m∨
i=1
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
)
)
→
m∨
i=1
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
)
Footnote 22 continued
the E-meaning of ‘⊥’ is (∀ζ)( → ζ), that is, (∀ζ)ζ. In the case where ni = 0, Ω is empty,
and so by the same convention, the E-meaning of ∗ is .
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for every j ∈ Ω. Clearly, c(gj(i)(∗Ii)) →
∨m
i=1 c(gj(i)(∗Ii)) for every i, by
∨I. Hence, by →E, ∨mi=1 c(gj(i)(∗Ii)) for every j ∈ Ω. Thus,
∧
j∈Ω
m∨
i=1
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
)
by ∧I, and so
m∨
i=1
∧
j∈Ω
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
)
by distributivity, which is equivalent to
m∨
i=1
ni∧
l=0
c (gl(∗Ii))
Corollary 1. (Local Completeness—aliter proof) ∗α follows from the E-
meaning of ∗.
Proof. Clearly,
∨m
i=1
∧ni
l=0 c(gl(∗Ii)) → ∗α, by ∧E, ∗Ii and ∨E. So by The-
orem 2 we have that
∧
j∈Ω
(∀ζ)
(
m∧
i=1
(
c
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
) → ζ
)
→ ζ
)
→ ∗α
Equivalence of I- and E-meanings generalizes from the propositional case
above to cases such as that of ‘∃’, to be discussed in Section 8. The E-
meaning expressed by ∃E is (∀ζ)((∀u)(α(u/x) → ζ) → ζ) for ‘u’ not free in
ζ, which is intuitionistically and classically equivalent to (∃x)α.
Higher-level rules were simpliﬁed in [7] to a form also found in [31, p. 135],
[42, p. 545], [22, p. 8] and [9, p. 619] in which only formulae are discharged.23
In [33], this simpliﬁcation is called “ﬂattening” of the higher-level rules. The
ﬂattened E-rule for ‘→’ reads:
α → β α [β]
1
γ
γ →E′(1)
It was shown in [33] that only in the context of classical reductio can we
be sure that the ﬂattened rules will be equivalent to the higher-level rules.
23However, the simpliﬁcation was rejected by Dyckhoﬀ for reasons given in [8].
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Intuitionistically, the ﬂattened GE-rules, such as those given in [9], are often
weaker than the I-rule warrants, and so are not stable.
Schroeder-Heister and Olkhovikov [39] demonstrate the weakness of ﬂat-
tened E-rules for certain intuitionistic connectives, such as ‘◦’. Suppose we
ﬂatten the GE-rule for ‘◦’ so that only formulae are discharged in the minor
premises:
◦(α, β, γ) α
[β]1
ζ
[γ]2
ζ
ζ
◦E′(1, 2)
The E-meaning of ‘◦’ given by ◦E′ is (∀ζ)(α ∧ (β → ζ)∧ (γ → ζ)) → ζ. It is
easy to see that this is classically equivalent to (∀ζ)(((α → β) → ζ) ∧ (γ →
ζ)) → ζ). But it is not intuitionistically equivalent to it. The latter implies
the former, but not vice versa. Thus ◦E′ is in harmony with ◦I1 and ◦I2,
but the rules are not (intuitionistically) stable. ◦E′ is too weak and does not
allow one to infer everything that the I-meaning of ‘◦’ warrants.24
7. Problems with Quantum Disjunction
We have shown in Sections 5–6 that the GE-rules of Section 3 are locally
complete and that their E-meanings entail (and indeed, are equivalent to)
their I-meanings. However, there is reason to doubt that local completeness
and implication of the I-meaning of a connective by its E-meaning really
succeed in formally capturing inverse harmony.
Consider the elimination-rule for ‘∨’ in quantum logic, which does not
allow parametric assumptions in the minor premises:25
α ∨ β [α]
1
γ
[β]2
γ
γ ∨EQ(1, 2)
This rule appears to be locally complete by Pfenning and Davies’ test, since
one can recover α ∨ β despite the restriction:26
α ∨ β
[α]1
α ∨ β ∨I1
[β]2
α ∨ β ∨I2
α ∨ β ∨EQ(1, 2)
24It had already been noted in [44, p. 506] that there “does not seem to be a suitable
set of E-rules” (that is, ﬂattened rules) for ‘◦’.
25See, e.g., [6, pp. 288–289; cf. p. 205].
26See [10, p. 95].
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But though ∨EQ is in harmony with ∨I (it does not allow one to infer more
than ∨I warrants), it is clearly incomplete, since it is weaker than ∨E (which
is also in harmony with ∨I) in that it does not permit one to establish the
distribution of ‘∧’ over ‘∨’, as ∨E in conjunction with the ∧-rules and ∨I
does.
Furthermore, the I- and E-meanings of ‘∨Q’ are equivalent. The I-meaning
of ‘∨Q’ is α ∨ β, and its E-meaning is (∀ζ)(((α → ζ) ∧ (β → ζ)) → ζ), and
these formulae are equivalent in classical, intuitionistic and quantum logic.
Thus, local completeness and implication of I-meanings by E-meanings do
not seem to capture the notion of inverse harmony successfully.
The example involving quantum disjunction is contentious. It is unclear
whether the ban on parametric assumptions is acceptable in a schematic
rule (as opposed, say, to requiring all parametric assumptions to have a
certain form, as in the normal ∀I-rule). For example, Humberstone [16, p.
587] criticizes ∨EQ for not respecting his demand of Generality in respect
of side formulas (p. 521). But Humberstone confesses that he has given no
argument for his Generality demands, other than to exclude the counterex-
amples. Francez [10, p. 115] rehearses an argument for the constraint from
[17, p. 720], but admits that he ﬁnds the argument unconvincing. Indeed,
the constraint seems to be violated by standard rules for the quantiﬁers and
for modality. In the same vein, Prawitz [28, p. 35] noted that his modal rules
do not satisfy his requirement that the rules be fully schematic.27 Absent a
clear and persuasive formulation of the constraint, the example of quantum
disjunction invites further reﬂection on means to establish inverse harmony
and, a fortiori, stability, to which we now turn.
8. Grounds for Assertion
Perhaps it was a mistake to respond to the objection that one cannot use ∨I
to recover α ∨ β from the application of ∨E to it by allowing the I-rules to
precede the minor premises of the application of the E-rule. Rather, what
we should require is that one derive the grounds for assertion of α ∨ β, or
in general, derive the grounds for assertion of ∗α from ∗α after application
of ∗E.
27Francez [10, p. 115] also notes the case of the modal rules. A way of dealing with
modality fully schematically is given in [1].
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For example, we can do this with ‘→’. Suppose we apply →E to derive
β from α → β and α, as in Section 3:
α → β
⎡
⎣
α....
β
⎤
⎦
1
β
→E(1)
or in the lo-
gistic nota-
tion
Γ ⇒ α → β
α ⇒ α Ass1
α, α ⇒ β ⇒ β Ass2
Γ, α ⇒ β → E
Note that, as we remarked in Section 3, while the sequent α ⇒ β is dis-
charged by →E, the assumption of α remains so far undischarged.
We have now obtained, through an application of →E, the grounds for
an assertion of α → β, namely, an assertion of β on the basis of α: g1(→I) =
α ⇒ β. From here, we can proceed to apply →I to discharge the assumption
of α and infer α → β:
α → β
⎡
⎣
[α]2....
β
⎤
⎦
1
β
→E(1)
α → β → I(2)
that is,
Γ ⇒ α → β
α ⇒ α Ass1
α, α ⇒ β ⇒ β Ass2
Γ, α ⇒ β → E
Γ ⇒ α → β → I
This may seem little diﬀerent from the derivation of α ∨ β from α ∨ β
in Section 5. But that derivation did not derive either of the grounds for
assertion of α ∨ β from α ∨ β. As remarked in Section 5, that is clearly
impossible, since those grounds are an assertion either of α or of β, and
neither α nor β follows from α ∨ β.
However, in a multiple-conclusion environment, such as is available in
classical logic, one can infer both α and β (disjunctively) from α∨β; and one
can mimic a multiple-conclusion environment in single-conclusion natural
deduction by use of the negation rules. First, note that in a single-conclusion
calculus, we can show that if one of the grounds for assertion of α∨β is not
available, the other must be, that is, given ¬β, one can infer α from α ∨ β;
and given ¬α, one can infer β from it. First, we need ex falso quodlibet as
¬E:
¬α α
β
¬E that is, Γ ⇒ ¬α Δ ⇒ α
Γ,Δ ⇒ β ¬E
Then we can argue:
α ∨ β [α]1
[β]2 ¬β
α
¬E
α
∨E(1, 2)
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that is,
α ∨ β ⇒ α ∨ β Ass1 α ⇒ α
β ⇒ β Ass1 ¬β ⇒ ¬β Ass1
β,¬β ⇒ α ¬E
α ∨ β,¬β ⇒ α ∨E
The prohibition on parametric assumptions in the minor premises of ∨EQ
prevents construction of the corresponding derivation.
Thus, in order to establish the derivability of grounds in a single-conclu-
sion setting, we must aim to show that we can derive each of the grounds
of one of the ∗I-rules from ∗α, given the falsehood of at least one of the
grounds of each of the other ∗I-rules. First, we need to clarify what is meant
by the falsity of a ground and by the derivation of a ground, when a ground
is a sequent of level 2.
Definition 11. ¬π = {β1, . . . , βl,¬γ} if π is β1, . . . , βl ⇒ γ.
Definition 12. A sequent π = β1, . . . , βl ⇒ γ is derivable from Γ if and
only if the sequent Γ, β1, . . . , βl ⇒ γ is derivable.
Also, recall the function η() deﬁned in Section 5. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
1 ≤ l ≤ ni, let ¬E(gl(∗Ii), β) be the following derivation:
η(gl(∗Ii)) ¬s(gl(∗Ii)) ⇒ ¬s(gl(∗Ii)) Ass1
gl(∗Ii),¬gl(∗Ii) ⇒ β ¬E
that is,
a(gl(∗Ii)), gl(∗Ii)) ⇒ s(gl(∗Ii)) ¬s(gl(∗Ii)) ⇒ ¬s(gl(∗Ii))
gl(∗Ii), a(gl(∗Ii)),¬s(gl(∗Ii)) ⇒ β ¬E
since
a(end(η(gl(∗Ii)))) = gl(∗Ii), a(gl(∗Ii))
s(end(η(gl(∗Ii)))) = s(gl(∗Ii)),
and
¬gl(∗Ii) = a(gl(∗Ii)),¬s(gl(∗Ii)).
Theorem 3. (Derivability of Grounds) For every 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and every
j ∈ Ω, gj(k)(∗Ik) is derivable from ∗α and ¬gj(i)(∗Ii) for every i = k.
Proof.
∗α ⇒ ∗α Ass1 . . . η(gj(k)(∗Ik)) . . . ¬E(gj(i)(∗Ii), s(gj(k)(∗Ik))) . . .
∗α,⋃i =k ¬gj(i)(∗Ii), a(gj(k)(∗Ik)) ⇒ s(gj(k)(∗Ik))
∗Ej
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since
a(end(η(gj(k)(∗Ik)))) = gj(k)(∗Ii), a(gj(k)(∗Ii)),
s(end(η(gj(k)(∗Ik)))) = s(gj(k)(∗Ik))
and ¬E(gj(i)(∗Ii), s
(
gj(k)(∗Ik)
) )
is
η
(
gj(i)(∗Ii)
) ¬s(gj(i)(∗Ii)
) ⇒ ¬s(gj(i)(∗Ii)
)
gj(i)(∗Ii),¬gj(i)(∗Ii) ⇒ gj(k)(∗Ik) ¬E
Thus, arguably, the single-conclusion setting has available resources en-
abling us to capture the idea of recovery of grounds and to show that the
E-rule for quantum disjunction is inadequate to recover the grounds for
assertion. In particular, the derivation of α from α∨Q β and ¬β is not sanc-
tioned by ∨EQ, since ¬β is a parametric assumption in the derivation of α
from β.
However, note that in Theorem 3, we use ex falso quodlibet (EFQ—in the
form of ¬E). This need to appeal to EFQ in the single-conclusion setting may
be seen as unsatisfactory, since EFQ is only an admissible rule in minimal
logic, not a derived rule. Thus, we do not have a proof that the grounds
for assertion for ∗α are derivable from ∗α in the case of M, as sought in
Prawitz’s Conjecture.
The single-conclusion approach is also faced with another diﬃculty. The
idea of deriving the grounds for assertion of ∗α from ∗α does not easily
generalize to cases where there are side conditions on ∗I or ∗E. Consider, ∃I
and ∃E, for example:
α(t/x)
(∃x)α ∃I and
(∃x)α
[α(u/x)]1
ζ
ζ
∃E(1)
provided that in ∃E, ‘u’ does not occur free in ζ or in any parametric as-
sumptions (that is, ‘u’ is fresh). As observed in [31, Sect. 2.6], ∃I can be
thought of heuristically as an inﬁnite collection of rules, one for each term
‘t’, so by the GE-procedure, ∃E should have inﬁnitely many minor premises,
each inferring the same conclusion from α(t/x) for each term ‘t’. The usual
∃E-rule with just one minor premise captures the eﬀect by inferring the
uniform conclusion ζ from an arbitrary instance α(u/x), so that the mi-
nor premise can go proxy for any of the derivations of the common ‘t’-free
conclusion ζ from α(t/x) by substituting ‘t’ for ‘u’ throughout the deriva-
tion, necessary for the simpliﬁcation establishing harmony. However, none
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of these instances of α(t/x) follows from (∃x)α, nor does α(u/x) even.28 If ζ
does follow from α(u/x), then ζ follows from (∃x)α, as ∃E states. But there
is no way back from (∃x)α to its grounds, α(t/x).
Moreover, consider the E-rule ∨EQ1, a rule similar to ∨EQ, but allow-
ing for singleton sets of formulae as parametric assumptions. As previously
shown, on the single-conclusion approach the grounds for α∨β are not deriv-
able from α∨β via ∨EQ, since, e.g., in deriving α from α∨β, the derivation
relies on the additional premise ¬β. But on the single-conclusion approach
the grounds for α∨β may be derived from α∨β via an application of ∨EQ1.
So, if the single-conclusion approach to the derivability of grounds success-
fully captured the notion of inverse harmony, then the rule ∨EQ1 would be
inversely harmonious with ∨I. But ∨EQ1 is not inversely harmonious with
∨I, since it is weaker than ∨E. Whereas ((γ ∧ ζ) ∧ α) ∨ ((γ ∧ ζ) ∧ β) is
derivable from γ, ζ and α ∨ β by ∨E and ∧I, no such derivation is possible
by appealing to ∨EQ1 and ∧I. Since ∨EQ1 is not inversely harmonious with
∨I, the single conclusion approach to the derivability of grounds does not
successfully capture the notion of inverse harmony.
Now consider the multiple-conclusion treatment of ‘∨’. Nodes will consist
of multisets of formulae. The rules are:
Γ, α
Γ, α ∨ β ∨I
M
1
Γ, β
Γ, α ∨ β ∨I
M
2
Γ, α ∨ β
[α]1
Δ, γ
[β]2
Θ, γ
Γ,Δ,Θ, γ ∨E
M(1, 2)
∨EM simpliﬁes classically to:
Γ, α ∨ β
Γ, α, β ∨E′M
as shown in [31, Sect. 3.2], which can also be written:
α ∨ β
α β ∨E′M
28Some systems of natural deduction, following [30, p. 164], contain a rule of existential
instantiation (EI), allowing one to infer α(u/x) from (∃x)α, provided ‘u’ is fresh. But, since
application of (EI) concludes in what Quine calls an “unﬁnished derivation,” it follows, as
Pelletier [24, p. 13] notes, that “under most interpretations [the inference from (∃x)α to
α(u/x)] is not semantically valid.”
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Then the local completeness of the rules for ‘∨’ is immediate: we have derived
the grounds for α ∨ β from α ∨ β itself:
α ∨ β
α
α ∨ β ∨I
M
1
β
α ∨ β ∨I
M
2
∨E′M
aliter,
α ∨ β
α, β ∨E′M
α ∨ β, β ∨I
M
1
α ∨ β, α ∨ β ∨I
M
2
α ∨ β Contraction
Moreover, in the multiple-conclusion case we can prove the grounds for
assertion, gl(∗Ik), directly, in disjunction with a choice of other grounds for
assertion of ∗α:
Theorem 4. (Derivability of Grounds—Multiple-Conclusion Case) We can
derive the multiple conclusion gj(1)(∗I1), . . . , gj(m)(∗Im) from ∗α for each
selection function j.
Proof. First, we need to formulate the multiple-conclusion rules for ∗α:
Γi,1,Θi,1 ⇒ Δi,1, αi,1 . . . Γi,ni ,Θi,ni ⇒ Δi,ni , αi,ni⋃ni
j=0 Γi,j ⇒
⋃ni
j=1 Δi,j , ∗α
∗IMi
Γ0 ⇒ Δ0, ∗α Γ1, gj(1)(∗IM1 ) ⇒ Δ1, γ . . . Γm, gj(m)(∗IMm) ⇒ Δm, γ⋃ni
k=0 Γk ⇒
⋃ni
k=0 Δk, γ
∗EMj
and we can write the latter as
Δ0, ∗α
[gj(1)(∗IM1 )]1
Δ1, γ . . .
[gj(m)(∗IMm)]m
Δm, γ
Δ0,Δ1, . . . ,Δm, γ
∗EMj (1, . . . ,m)
Then:
∗α ⇒ ∗α . . .
η(gj(i)(∗IMi ))
⋃
k =i a(gj(k)(∗IMk )), gj(i)(∗IMi ), a(gj(i)(∗IMi )) ⇒ s(gj(i)(∗IMi )),
⋃
k =i s(gj(k)(∗IMk ))
Thin
. . .
∗α, ⋃m
i=1 a(gj(i)(∗IMi )) ⇒
⋃m
i=1 s(gj(i)(∗IMi ))
∗EM
j
since
a(end(η(gj(i)(∗IMi )))) = a(gj(i)(∗IMi )), gj(i)(∗IMi )
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and
s(end(η(gj(i)(∗IMi )))) = s(gj(i)(∗IMi )).
In fact, Theorem 4 also applies to intuitionistic logic, since intuitionis-
tic logic can be given a multiple-conclusion formulation by restricting the
premise of →I (and of ¬I and ∀I, if present) to a single formula.29 If we
admit inﬁnitary multiple conclusions, we can derive the inﬁnitary set of all
wﬀs α(t/x) from (∃x)α.
However, even in the multiple-conclusion case derivability of grounds ar-
guably does not capture the informal notion of inverse harmony. Converting
the multiple-conclusion sequent calculus GO† for quantum logic of [2, p. 226]
to natural deduction yields the following E-rule for disjunction:30
Γ, α ∨ β
[α]1
Δ
[β]2
Δ
Γ,Δ ∨E
M
Q (1, 2)
As in the single-conclusion case, parametric assumptions are not allowed in
the minor premises. In the presence of the elimination rule ∨EMQ , the grounds
for an assertion of α∨Qβ are derivable from α∨Qβ (in a multiple-conclusion
setting, the I-rules for quantum disjunction are just ∨IM1 and ∨IM2 ):
α ∨Q β
[α]1
α, β
Thin
[β]2
α, β
Thin
α, β
∨EMQ (1, 2)
This result appears to show that the multiple-conclusion treatment of the
derivability of the grounds of assertion does not successfully capture the
informal notion of inverse harmony.
We turn, therefore, to a ﬁnal way of formally capturing the notion of
inverse harmony by generalizing the property of local completeness.
9. Generalized Local Completeness
Recall Lorenzen’s inversion principle: it required that the E-rules for a con-
nective ∗ be strong enough not only to derive the judgment ∗α, but anything
29See, e.g., [41, Sect. 3.5.10].
30In these systems the cut rule is restricted, since otherwise the distribution of ‘∧’ over
‘∨’ would be restored. See [2, p. 247] and [16, p. 301].
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that judgment implies. Pfenning and Davies’ proposal (considered in Section
5 above) required only that the E-rules be strong enough to infer everything
necessary to derive the original assertion to which those rules were applied.
We now see that Lorenzen was right to require that they be strong enough
to infer anything that follows from that assertion.
What is missing in Lorenzen’s account, however, and was absent in Davies
and Pfenning’s formulation of local completeness, is inclusion of the para-
metric assumptions that may be in play. Accordingly, we need to take ac-
count of both issues in generalizing the notion of local completeness to the
requirement of generalized local completeness as follows:
Definition 13. (Generalized Local Completeness)
• The E-rules for a connective ∗ are generally locally complete relative to
a nonempty set of I-rules if and only if for any system S of the sort
deﬁned in Section 2, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Γi and ζ, if ζ is derivable in S
from Γi and gj(∗Ii), for all 0 ≤ j ≤ ni, then ζ is derivable in S from⋃m
i=1 Γi and ∗α by appealing only to derivations of ζ from Γi, gj(∗Ii),
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ ni, the E-rules for ∗ and structural rules.
• The E-rules for a connective ∗ are generally locally complete relative to
an empty set of I-rules if and only if for any system S of the sort deﬁned
in Section 2 then ζ is derivable in S from ∗α by appealing only to the
E-rules for ∗ and structural rules.
Local completeness is a special case of generalized local completeness in
two respects. First, in local completeness, ζ is ∗α itself. Secondly, ζ (i.e.,
∗α) is derived from ∗α without considering any assumptions besides its
grounds. Thus, generalized local completeness imposes a requirement at least
as strong as local completeness. As should already be apparent, it imposes a
requirement that is strictly stronger. The E-rules for ∨EQ are locally com-
plete even though they are not generally locally complete: (γ∧α)∨Q(γ∧β) is
derivable both from γ, α and from γ, β, even though (γ∧α)∨Q (γ∧β) is not
derivable from γ and α ∨Q β. The weakness of the E-rules for ∨Q displayed
in the single-conclusion calculus discussed in Section 8 is another instance of
the same phenomenon: even though α is derivable both from α and from β
and ¬β, it is not derivable from α∨Qβ and ¬β, given the prohibition on para-
metric assumptions in the minor premises of ∨EQ. Similarly, the ∨EQ1-rule
is not generally locally complete: ((γ∧ζ)∧α)∨Q1((γ∧ζ)∧β) is derivable both
from γ, ζ and α, and from γ, ζ and β, even though ((γ∧ζ)∧α)∨Q1((γ∧ζ)∧β)
is not derivable from γ, ζ and α ∨Q1 β.
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We now observe that the E-rules generated by the GE-procedure from
the I-rules for any connective ∗ satisfy the requirement of generalized local
completeness:
Theorem 5. (Generalized Local Completeness) Let ∗ be an n-ary connec-
tive, for any n ∈ N, governed by a set of introduction-rules. Then the GE-
rules for ∗ are generally locally complete.
The proof of Theorem 5 is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem
1, and thus we omit it.31 The proof requires no principles not available in
minimal logic, and so avoids the objections to the use of EFQ in the attempt
to recover the grounds for assertion mooted in Section 8. In particular, it
ﬁnally gives a positive answer to Prawitz’s Conjecture: the set of inference
rules warranted by the meaning conferred on the logical constants by the
set of I-rules for each logic S are derivable from the addition to those rules
of the GE-rules generated by them.
We have seen that the E-rules for quantum disjunction are not generally
locally complete. If generalized local completeness indeed captures the infor-
mal notion of inverse harmony, then this is as it should be. Moreover, in the
previous section we also noted that derivability of grounds was not easily
generalizable to cases where there are side conditions on ∗I or ∗E, another
reason for seeking a diﬀerent formal account of inverse harmony. How does
generalized local completeness fare in this respect?
Consider the standard I-rule for the universal quantiﬁer,
α(u/x)
(∀x)α ∀I
31The one crucial diﬀerence between the two proofs lies in the deﬁnition of Pf (), with
the function now being deﬁned as follows:
Pf (j) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ai
Γi, g1(∗Ii), . . . , gni(∗Ii) ⇒ ζ if j = ξil ∈ Ξ,
∗α ⇒ ∗α Ass1 Pf (δ1(j)) . . . Pf (δm(j))⋃m
i=1
⋃ni
k=j(i)+1 gk(∗Ii),
⋃m
i=1 Γi, ∗α ⇒ ζ
∗Ej if j ∈ Ω,
Note that i) when the set of I-rules is empty, ∗ is ‘⊥’ and we obtain the derivation:
⊥ ⇒ ⊥ Ass1
⊥ ⇒ ζ ⊥E ; and ii) when one of the I-rules has no premises, ∗ is ‘’ and we obtain the
derivation:
A
Γ ⇒ ζ
,Γ ⇒ ζ Thin .
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provided that ‘u’ does not occur free in any parametric assumptions. In [31]
it was shown how the rule ∀I can be thought of heuristically as a restriction
to a ﬁnitary setting of the inﬁnitary rule ∀I∞:
α(t1/x) α(t2/x) . . .
(∀x)α ∀I∞
with a premise α(ti/x) for every term ti in the language. There, the GE-rules
for the universal quantiﬁer,
(∀x)α
[α(ti/x)]1
ζ
ζ
∀Ei(1)
one for each term ti, were shown to be harmonious, since they are in harmony
with ∀I∞, and equivalent to the standard E-rule for ∀:
(∀x)α
α(t/x) ∀E
Moreover, the GE-rules ∀Ei are generally locally complete with respect to
the rule ∀I∞. For suppose that we have a derivation of ζ from the (inﬁnitely
many) premises of ∀I∞ in the context Γ:32
Γ, α(t1/x), α(t2/x), . . .
B
ζ
Then, in an inﬁnitary setting we can construct the following derivation:33
(∀x)α
(∀x)α
Γ, [α(t1/x)]1, [α(t2/x)]2, . . .
B
ζ
ζ
∀E1(1)
ζ
∀E2(2)
....
...
The proof is inﬁnitely long, and has no last step. Nonetheless, it is a deriva-
tion of ζ depending only on Γ and (∀x)α as open assumptions. By way of
32To avoid misunderstanding, note that Γ, α(t1/x), α(t2/x), . . . here denotes the undis-
charged assumptions on which ζ depends.
33Here the vertical ellipses represent inﬁnitely long derivations, not assumptions of
derivations.
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analogy, take the set of natural numbers, and successively remove each pos-
itive integer, starting with 1. At each ﬁnite step, we are left with an inﬁnite
set {0, n, n+1, . . .} for some n. Nonetheless, once the whole process is com-
pleted (of which there is no last step), we are left with the singleton set {0}.
Similarly here: each ﬁnite initial segment of the derivation is a derivation of
ζ from the inﬁnite set of open assumptions Γ, (∀x)α, α(tn/x), α(tn+1/x), . . ..
But once the proof is completed, we have a derivation of ζ from Γ and (∀x)α
alone.
These considerations are, of course, purely heuristic. We do not have
an inﬁnite system of proof with inﬁnitely long proofs from inﬁnitely many
assumptions. Instead, we simplify the inﬁnitary rule ∀I∞ to the standard
rule ∀I, which we can now see to be in inverse harmony with the set of
E-rules ∀Ei. For suppose that we have the following derivation:
Γ, α(u/x)
A
ζ
for some term u = ti. Then we can apply ∀Ei to derive ζ from Γ, (∀x)α:
(∀x)α
Γ, [α(u/x)]1
A
ζ
ζ
∀Ei(1)
Thus, given that generalized local completeness is the appropriate rendering
of inverse harmony, this result shows that the GE-rules for the universal
quantiﬁer are indeed inversely harmonious.
Consider next the inﬁnitary E-rule ∃E∞ for the existential quantiﬁer:
(∃x)α
[α(t1/x)]1
ζ
[α(t2/x)]2
ζ . . .
ζ
∃E∞(1, 2, . . .)
As mentioned in Section 8, the standard rule ∃E can be thought of heuristi-
cally as the restriction to the ﬁnitary case of the inﬁnitary rule ∃E∞.34 Just
as the harmony of the GE-rules for the universal quantiﬁer is established
with respect to the inﬁnitary I-rule ∀I∞, it is the inﬁnitary rule ∃E∞ that
should be shown to be generally locally complete. The proof of this result is
straightforward. Suppose that, for each i, we have the following derivation:
34See also [20, Sect. 8.5].
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Γi, α(ti/x)
Ai
ζ
Then we can derive ζ from
⋃
i Γi and (∃x)α, showing that the ∃-rules are
generally locally complete:
(∃x)α
Γ1, [α(t1/x)]1
A1
ζ
Γ2, [α(t2/x)]2
A2
ζ . . .
ζ
∃E∞(1, 2, . . .)
Given the robustness of generalized local completeness, we propose that
this property does indeed capture the informal notion of inverse harmony.
Theorem 5 establishes that the GE-rules are inversely harmonious. This
result, in conjunction with their harmony, ensures that the GE-rules are
stable with respect to the I-rules from which they are generated.
10. Conclusion
The idea of logical inferentialism is that the rules for logical expressions give
them their meaning. General-elimination inferentialism, as one might call
it, takes the introduction-rules as prior in conferring meaning, the general-
elimination rules being no more than consequences of the meaning so pro-
vided. But the E-rules should not merely be justiﬁed by the meaning con-
ferred by the I-rules; they should allow one to infer everything that is war-
ranted by that meaning. When they do, the rules are not only harmonious,
but stable. GE-harmony is the thesis that the GE-procedure generates GE-
rules that are harmonious relative to the I-rules from which they are gener-
ated. GE-stability is the claim that the GE-rules are not only harmonious,
but also inversely harmonious, that is, they allow one to infer not only no
more, but also no less than is warranted by the I-rules from which they are
generated.
Four tests for stability have been considered. Local completeness requires
that one be able to give a non-vacuous derivation of an arbitrary formula
dependent on itself using only the I- and E-rules for its main connective.
We showed that the GE-rules satisfy that test, but queried whether the test
was adequate, since the clearly unstable rules of quantum disjunction seem
to pass the test. Perhaps the ∨E-rule of quantum logic should already be
excluded as not being fully schematic, but a reason must be given for the
exclusion which is not ad hoc.
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An alternative proposal developed a recent suggestion of capturing the I-
and E-meanings in (meta-)formulae expressing, respectively, the grounds for
assertion and the inferences justiﬁed by such an assertion. It was shown that
in the case of the GE-rules, the formulae expressing the I- and E-meanings
of a connective are equivalent, both classically and intuitionistically (and
indeed, in minimal logic M). But quantum disjunction again seems to show
that the equivalence is insuﬃcient to demonstrate stability.
A third proposal was that one should be able to derive not just the
original assertion itself, but its grounds. In a single-conclusion or multiple-
conclusion calculus, for classical or intuitionistic logic, it can be done for
propositional logic. Even so, in the case of the single-conclusion calculus, the
need to appeal to EFQ entails that the demonstration has not established
Prawitz’s Conjecture, which was made for minimal logic M, in which EFQ
is only an admissible rule, and not derivable. Moreover, in the presence
of quantiﬁers (or modality), where there are side conditions on the minor
premises, there is no way back from the conclusion to the grounds. Finally,
the single-conclusion calculus fails to exclude ‘∨Q1’. The multiple-conclusion
calculus avoids the ﬁrst two problems, but still fails to exclude ‘∨Q’.
Finally, we returned to the notion of local completeness, generalizing
it to require the inclusion of parametric formulae, and the derivation of
an arbitrary conclusion, and showed that the rules generated by the GE-
procedure satisfy the more stringent test, while excluding the unstable rules
for quantum disjunction. Hence, the general-elimination procedure guaran-
tees stability, that is, the E-rules generated by the I-rules according to the
general-elimination procedure allow one to infer no more and no less than
is justiﬁed by the meaning conferred by the I-rules.
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